Across the past fifty years, a massive literature has been published about business history in the United States. Many graduate and undergraduate programs have introduced core or elective courses, while specialized topics such as the history of accounting, management information systems, or marketing and marketing thought have received growing interest. The development of any academic field is a complex phenomenon, one conditioned by environmental factors and the initiatives of specific schools or individuals. Some writers have linked the attention Americans have given business history to scholars such as Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., whose research has not just provided intellectual insights but reshaped management theory. Thomas McCraw (1988, 11) , the current editor of Business History Review, for instance, has claimed Chandler did "not so much rehabilitate a field gone to seed, but instead established business history as an independent and important area for study."
Chandler, however, has always noted that his work rests on the efforts of previous scholars, and American business history has been an identifiable field for nearly seventy years. Ironically, a Canadian, Norman Scott Brien Gras, played a key role in its materialization. Gras offered the first American business history course, held the first endowed chair in the subject, and cultivated the preparation of academics and professional publications. Recognition of his role has vanished with time, and even histories of the Harvard Business School contain few observations (Copeland 1958; Cruikshank 1987 ). This article reconsiders Gras's career, placing in perspective his contributions and difficulties. Save for extracts of a journal released posthumously and other papers retained at Harvard University, few of his personal records have survived. The analysis thus is drawn principally from his published works or related secondary materials. The narrative is divided into four sections. The intellectual origins of the broader domain of economic history are first reviewed. Then, Gras's career will be considered, along with his efforts to establish business history as a distinctive field. Finally, his problematic legacy will be appraised.
THE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND
The study of business history arose from tangled intellectual roots and a complex trans-Atlantic exchange of ideas. Prior to 1870, neither history nor economics were deemed important subjects at American colleges. Given the high costs of research, the former was the province of amateurs concerned with local studies or wealthy gentlemen who treated history as a literary art, which should romantically reveal the character and progress of a nation (Hofstadter 1968, 13-34; Levin 1959) . Political economy was appraised in a rudimentary manner as part of courses about moral philosophy. At Harvard and Columbia, it was taught from Millicent Fawcett's (1876, v) Political Economy for Beginners, a short tome intended for "boys' and girls' schools." Since American colleges were predominantly concerned with educating the clergy or the wealthy, lecturers tended to emphasize Christian morality as a means of conserving the authority of traditional elites. Discussions of social affairs were restricted to senior-level courses that reviewed the traits of human nature and stressed the need for genteel conduct or social stewardship (Hall 1982, chap. 3-5; Ross 1991, 35-37, 42-47) .
This orientation toward higher learning was transformed by several phenomena during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Urbanization and industrialization stimulated the formation of an identifiable middle class, which served as an escalator between different levels of American society. Members of this segment were increasingly recognized not by familial background or wealth per se but because they comprehended useful or scientific intelligence providing value to other citizens. Many vocational groups attempted to achieve this status by organizing into professions with coherent bodies of knowledge and relevant occupational norms. The extension of transport networks and the elaboration of new technologies also propelled a metamorphosis of manufacturing and distribution from competition among small enterprises toward rivalry between oligopolistic producers. With strong needs for knowledge-oriented executives, the larger enterprises further stimulated the spread of professional associations and university education. The emergence of corporate capitalism, in turn, fostered new class divisions and social problems, issues that spurred demands for governmental action and for enlightened authorities capable of designing appropriate public policies (Wiebe 1967, 2-43; Keller 1977 Keller , 1990 Rodgers 1998) .
Given the academic deficiencies of colleges in the United States, Americans who wished to pursue postgraduate education often attended institutions throughout Western Europe. For example, between 1820 and 1920, nearly 9,000 enrolled at German universities, public institutions with low tuition fees but offering a broad range of scholarship in professional studies and the humanities. As the German-trained students gained academic positions back in the United States, they introduced courses about the social sciences and key aspects of German academic life: seminars, laboratories, and scholarly journals or associations. To redefine academe as a professional activity, many lobbied for university policies that stipulated graduate (especially doctoral) degrees and peerreviewed research as criteria for recruitment and promotion. This pattern was reinforced as the foreign-trained professors then sent their own students abroad for postgraduate studies (Herbst 1965; Furner 1975) .
Between 1870 and the 1890s, a wave of trans-Atlantic exchange emanated from German erudition in economics. As early as the 1840s, a rival approach to classical economic theory had been generated by a small group of scholars based in German faculties of law who were concerned with the interrelationships between moral philosophy and social activities. Because their students were preparing for civil service careers, "historical economists" such as Bruno Hildebrand, Karl Kneis, and Wilhelm Roscher focused on the study of public finance and governmental administration to develop a science of policy formation. They rejected the emphases placed by classical economists on technical analysis, the existence of axiomatic laws of human behavior, or the value of abstract deduction from ideal postulates. Instead, drawing on prior traditions in German legal thought, Roscher and his compatriots characterized politics or economics as manifestations of a "policy mind," a "representation [Darstellung] of what nations have thought, willed, and discovered in the economic field, what they have striven after and why they have attained it." Accordingly, they suggested, economics should be considered a science of fact (rather than theory) based on analyses of the evolution of jurisprudence or politics. The history of different nations was characterized as an unfolding of the human spirit, which proceeded through cycles of birth, maturation, decline, and possible death. Through empirical research, scholars could map those patterns, generating a "firm island of scientific truth which may be accepted in the same manner as the adherents of different systems of medicine all admit the teaching of mathematical physics." With this background knowledge, social leaders then could devise policies to fit a nation's "age" (Roscher [1894 (Roscher [ ] 1900 Iggers 1968, 6-12) .
Historical economists such as Gustav von Schmoller, Adolphe Wagner, and Karl Bücher minimized the value of deductive thinking in the social sciences. Schmoller, for example, researched business and political leadership during modern European history. He argued that it would be possible to build a science of political economy from inductive analysis of empirical data. He and his colleagues characterized government intervention as a positive force, and they ridiculed competition or the pursuit of profit as sources of class conflict. Free trade and other tenets of classical theory were derisively characterized not as natural law but as "Manchester economics," ideological notions that had been advanced to support the competitive status of British exporters (Ashley 1900, 33-34; Schumpeter 1954, 808-12) . Although the historical economists forcefully asserted their value judgments in political affairs, their academic credo was critical of unsubstantiated generalizations. They expected that monographic research about social institutions would generate a knowledge base for a set of general economics. Concurrently, they protested against the "isolating" character of academic specialization. Schmoller, in particular, called for an examination of all facets of behavior, the whole of human motivation as historically displayed. His later works gave heavy emphasis to subjects such as ethnology, anthropology, or psychology as determinants of economic conditions (Ashley 1900, 6; Iggers 1968, 129-33) .
This stream of thought challenged the preconceived notions of many American students. They assimilated aspects with potential value for their own society, although none wished to imitate the authoritarian ethos of the Hohenzollern Reich. Particularly appealing were ideals such as the ability of collective groups to overcome the supposed inevitability of natural forces, or the role of government as a moralizing agent through the use of regulation and public ownership (Fine 1956, 198-212; Rodgers 1998, 95-102) . Richard T. Ely, for example, proclaimed the ascendancy of a "political economy of the present," which would provide social leadership based not on technical analysis but on experience and inductive judgment (Rader 1966, 28-82) . Extensive controversies ensued as the German-trained economists secured positions in American universities and tried to propagate their views. Conservative academics eventually regained ascendancy but could not eradicate the alternate perspective. Rather, the two groups coexisted and evolved independently, although many historical economists later drifted toward public service and new departments of sociology or business administration (Furner 1975; Jones and Monieson 1990; Ross 1991) .
With the exception of labor studies, Ely and like-minded scholars such as John R. Commons did not generate a corpus of historical investigations, but they drew attention to that approach and animated the topic of economic development (termed economic dynamics) as an area of specialty. Even orthodox theorists believed culture, idea frameworks, or social institutions were key variables that influenced long-term economic growth. Since reliable statistical data or mathematical techniques were not available, inductive analysis seemed an appropriate methodology for analyzing those issues. A tacit accommodation occurred as economic history (exemplified by individuals such as Vladimir Simkovitch at Columbia or William J. Ashley and Edwin F. Gay at Harvard) was differentiated from historical economics. The approach of the former became known as American institutionalism, an intellectual paradigm that acknowledged the legitimacy of classical economic theory even though it was not extensively used.
In addition to German scholarship, this orientation drew heavily on extant research within the historical profession, especially the work of constitutional historians who had established an extensive literature about subjects such as medieval manors or towns. Instead of a search for the policy mind of the past, research thus was geared to the reconstruction of patterns of social institutions. Mirroring the conservative values of the era and perceptions of Darwinist theories, social evolution was characterized as a "genetic" process that fostered order, discipline, and economic progress. Scholars who adhered to this perspective emphasized the deterministic impact of external forces on the constitutions of institutions, rather than the voluntaristic actions of individuals. The researcher's task was characterized as charting what had happened in the chains of causes and effects behind the formation of social organizations. By carefully assembling data from all available sources, the historian then would induce the structure and underlying spirit of an institution, with the empirical results presented through detailed nonemotional narratives. This approach was portrayed as "scientific," an objective reconstruction of the past but without the moral judgments or literary embellishments of amateur writers.
In time, institutional historians expected, monographs about different activities would be assembled and readers would comprehend the patterns of social evolution if the studies were organized chronologically (Higham 1989, 92-103; Novick 1988, 47-85) . While their approach was portrayed as a factual documentation of past developments, the strongest adherents still hoped for a prophetic role. Historians, Ashley (1900, v, 7, 20) observed, would reveal "a connected and consecutive whole" rather than "a chaos of meaningful fragments." If people understood "the curve of economic evolution, they could take steps towards something better for humanity in the future."
Although historical topics became a significant form of research in economics departments, economic history remained a tenuous field with few full-time positions. From 1892 to 1901, at Harvard, Ashley occupied the sole chair in the subject. During the following decade, only Guy S. Callender (his sole doctoral student) and Edwin F. Gay (his successor) were full-time economic historians, whereas their colleagues elsewhere devoted much time to pursuits outside of the field. Although he personally found research and writing difficult, Gay assigned historical theses to his doctoral students in Harvard's economics department. The well-connected academic then helped the graduates secure appointments with universities or government agencies. Most of their efforts were essentially chronicles, with modest technical appraisals, based on topics drawn from contemporary political controversies (Cole 1968, 560-64; Gras 1927, 25-26) .
But from the beginning, the formation of a solid group of academics devoted to the historical analysis of economic phenomena seemed cursed. Ashley and Gay went on to administrative careers, the former heading the new commerce department at the University of Birmingham and the latter becoming the founding dean of the Harvard Business School. Three of the brightest minds-Callender, Thomas CliffeLeslie, and Arnold Toynbee-died before fulfilling their promise. Few permanent interrelationships were elaborated with sociology and history departments as historical economists withdrew from active participation in economics. Many focused on political reform causes, or their research endeavors were scaled back from grand overviews toward focused social surveys or studies of group behavior (Jones and Monieson 1990; Ross 1991, 257-300) . In addition, "marginalism" or the neoclassical synthesis arose as the dominant paradigm among American economists between 1890 and 1920. Convinced the approach clarified many issues and could be used to legitimate liberal capitalism, its adherents pressed for the rigorous use of theory and mathematics (Ross 1991, 173-218) . On the surface, Joseph Schumpeter (1954, 954) later observed, "The result was bedlam . . . a bedlam of discordant voices, all of which seemed to testify to the presence of an impasse." Nonetheless, historical research was slowly pushed toward the margins as neoclassical economists reshaped their profession. Economic historians also fragmented into distinctive concerns such as agricultural or labor studies. Thus, economic history remained poorly defined by the 1920s, without professional associations or journals, a difficult domain in which individuals might gain repute.
THE SCHOLAR
"I cannot accept the dictum that ancestors are like potatoes because the best part is always underground," Norman Gras (1962, 154) wrote in his journal, for "I do believe that they live on in us and play their part. This is the germ of human mortality and the only surely permanent contribution." Like many scholars, Gras's career was shaped by his background. His father's family could be traced to Michael Grass, a German who emigrated in 1752 from Strasbourg to the Mohawk Valley. Grass was captured while fighting with British forces against New France during the Seven Years War and was imprisoned near Kingston, Ontario. The farmer and saddler later refused to bring his militia out in support of the American revolutionaries. He moved to British-controlled New York City and subsequently brought a group of loyalists north across the St. Lawrence River. The family eventually scattered across the province of Ontario. Gras's grandfather settled Ridgetown in the southwest peninsula-about sixty miles from London. His mother's ancestors originated from Armagh, Ireland. Meredith Conn was a linen weaver, teacher, and ship's captain who settled near Tyrconnel on the Ontario coast of Lake Erie. He established a position as a farmer, merchant, and lay preacher, a man of distinction in the community.
Gras's father tried to manage a general store but, in the difficult conditions of the late nineteenth century, assigned repeatedly when farmers defaulted on debts. The family moved from Ridgetown to Toronto (where Norman was born in 1884), shifted to Halifax, came back to Ridgetown, moved to North Dakota, returned to Ridgetown, and finally settled in London, where his father purchased a milk route business. Still struggling, his mother set up a boarding house, and Norman supported the family through a variety of manual jobs. This insecurity convinced the adolescent that his future required greater education, an orientation ardently supported by his mother. Gras spent long hours at the public library, his curiosity initiating a habit of voracious reading that provided him with an extraordinary range of knowledge that later staggered his associates. "I chose to read about hypnotism, phrenology, and physiognomy. Alchemy also intrigued me. I made a classification of all knowledge, based on the catalogue of the Library," he subsequently observed. "Quite clearly by then my character was formed. I put intellect first, the economic second, the aesthetic third, religion fourth, and the social last. I used to attend the Methodist churches regularly but found their influence a diminishing factor. I had already learned that both bad and good were within the sacred walls" (Gras 1962, 156) .
Gras attended the Western University (now the University of Western Ontario) and stayed on by winning a scholarship every year until a bachelor of arts was awarded in 1906 and a master's degree in 1907. He viewed the experience as beneficial in terms of receiving guidance about several subjects and the opportunity to sample many disciplines. "At the University I met a motley group of good, bad, and indifferent," he later noted. "The divinity students were the worst. They were ignorant, lying, and dishonest, with only a few exceptions." He chose to attend Harvard with the hope of learning from historians such as Albert Bushnell Hart. His mother traveled with him and set up a boarding house, while Norman worked as a waiter. Attracting little attention at the "entirely cold and frigid" university, the studies undertaken at Western were repeated for a master's degree in economics that was conferred during 1909 (Gras 1962, 156-57) .
Upon attending a doctoral seminar handled by Edwin F. Gay, Gras, fluent in five languages, suddenly excelled. He was assigned the evolution of the English grain trade as a dissertation topic and received a fellowship to cover the costs of data collection during two years in Britain. Summoned back to Harvard in 1912 for the defense of his thesis, Gras narrowly missed a return on the Titanic. "I answered every question except those that no one could answer. At last I knew my subject and could express all shades of subtleties in it" (Gras 1962, 160) . Faculty positions for economic historians only became available occasionally, and an appointment with Dalhousie University was denied after Gras emphasized a desire to conduct research during an interview. "I was later to be very grateful for this failure," he claimed. Securing an assistant professorship at Clark College in Worcester, Massachusetts, he taught two unfamiliar subjects. "I had the students do the work for me. They lectured and quizzed one another. There was much merriment." A course in economic history was offered free of charge to the college. "There I had a mature group and received my greatest satisfaction-working for nothing" (Gras 1962, 160-61) . To supplement his income, Gras lectured at Harvard and Pembroke College in Providence. During 1918, Gay secured Gras a position with the War Trade Board, but tedious work during a Washington summer proved unbearable, and the young academic precipitously resigned.
Still lacking a direction for his career, Gras accepted a professorship in the University of Minnesota's history department because the institution reputedly was well endowed. "I did not know about the difficult climate in both winter and summer. I did not know about the immaturity of the Scandinavian students. But I came to respect their earnestness." He taught economic history to 550 first-year business students and offered several upper-level courses, including social psychology and philosophy. Although he enjoyed graduate candidates, "the vapid generalities and the immaturity" of others were regular sources of complaint (Gras 1962, 164) . Gras resented the time lost for faculty socialization or dinner engagements and became despondent about his unfulfilled expectations:
Here I am a cog in a machine, an honourable cog but still just that. I am chief household drudge, apart from my wife. The roof, the furnace, the electric appliances demand my attention. I master them individually but they control me collectively. I have a lurking suspicion that much of the trouble lies in myself. The fact that I don[']t want to live here indefinitely, causes me to be anxious for the change, impatient, blind to local advantages. (Gras 1962, 174) Nonetheless, Gras generated a series of works that mapped patterns of economic systems. Following the institutional paradigm, he portrayed economic development as a process of long-term improvement and linked American practices to European or British antecedents. His writing style was extremely dry and without flair, while his narratives used materials from many subjects. His approach drew on the work of Gustav Schmoller and Richard Ehrenburg, but their concepts were elaborated into detailed schema through the construction of typologies and graphic representations. It paralleled efforts by European historians such as Henri Pirenne or Alfons Dopsch, who saw continuity from ancient and medieval economies and who focused on the logic associated with a transition from a barter system to one based on money, capital, and entrepreneurs (Breisach 1983, 355-56) . Very conservative in orientation, Gras was comfortable with medieval or early-modern events but found contemporary affairs difficult to appraise objectively. His publications did not reflect on the controversies that shaped American historiography across the early twentieth century (Novick 1988, 87-205) . Indeed, societal turbulence, class divisions, or regional conflicts rarely were even acknowledged.
Although other economic historians drew on more contemporary scholars such as Karl Bücher or Werner Sombart, Gras derided the value of these "new" writers because they were concerned with ideal organizations or were critical of modern business. Economic history, he contended, entailed "the genetic approach, a study of the genesis of institutions, habits and innovations, as they are being born and reborn in their various forms." Numerous advantages might accrue from an appraisal of the past as a "significant series of stages." "It takes us back to anthropological and archeological beginnings and brings us on to the very present. It omits non-essentials" (Gras 1927, 31) . Each stage was "a socially competitive condition in which a new method or institution first rivals, then threatens, and finally out-distances an old one. . . . But the victory is long uncertain and rarely, if ever, complete" (Gras 1930b, 397) .
Evolutionary patterns could be documented by mapping the repetitious conditions that had unfolded in different countries. However, he acknowledged researchers might incorrectly adduce some form of inevitable progression. Their analyses had to be supplemented by studies of "lateral causal influences," including shifts in the environment or modifications of psychological attitudes. Still, the "broader the treatment the more significant the result. . . . More facts are required but they should lead to new generalizations rather than simply support old ones." Economic history must be made an intellectual discipline in which creative imagination and statistical testing play strong counterparts and until the field is put wholly upon a scientific basis, the best results will not be forthcoming. . . . After all, what counts is not our individual contribution but the progress of science. Among the highest ideals are discrimination, clarity, honesty to one's theme, and, above all, unselfish contribution to the stream of progress. (Gras 1927, 31-32) Mindful of the potential of the subject, Gras had few illusions about the available research:
Much commonplace expressionistic stuff, purely undisciplined subjective revelation, passes for literature; while the driest, most unrelieved and unleavened cataloguing of objective phenomena passes for science. There is much in between the two extremes, much that is fine literature and appealing science. (Gras 1927, 32) His first book (Gras 1915) , an enduring empirical contribution, charted the evolution of English grain markets between the twelfth and the eighteenth centuries. Based on archival records, the presence of organized movements of wheat between manors during the period of 1100 to 1250 was adduced. These took the form of arm's-length sales of surplus crops or intramanorial movements from "food farms" to the residences of owners. Local market growth and the construction of territorial markets were instrumental in breaking up this regime. The new markets covered several counties, and trade within each was carried on relatively independent of other regions. A third stage consisted of two periods. From 1500 to 1660, municipal markets (London or other urban centers) influenced prices over wide regions; after 1660, London dominated economic activities and coordinated operations linked to European markets. This approach was applied in two meticulous works: a monograph (Gras 1918 ) that became a standard reference on the customs practices of England and a volume (Gras and Gras 1930 ) coauthored with his wife, which charted the evolution of an English village from prehistoric to contemporary times.
Gras became best known for broad overviews of economic history. Writing in simple, comprehensible terms, he delineated various typologies of evolutionary phases that appeared to have occurred across time. The historical "facts" for the schema varied, but a wide variety of sources were consulted, including literature, mythology, archaeology, religious manuscripts, and business or economic publications. By the rigorous standards that later prevailed in the historical profession, the categorizations had questionable validity, even though Gras depicted them as products of scientific analysis. Although each study advanced a distinctive framework (see Table 1 ), he rarely drew explicit cross-comparisons between different phenomena, and the output did not lead to an integrative synthesis, the long-run goal of institutional historians.
His most influential volume, An Introduction to Economic History (Gras 1922) , advanced a five-stage conceptualization of economic development based on American and British experiences, and it had a significant influence on the research of historians such as Fernand Braudel and J.M.S. Careless. Prehistorical activities based on a simple act of hunting or collecting natural resources were succeeded by a cultural nomadic economy that combined collection and early cultivation techniques. The apparent origins of nucleated or nonnucleated villages were outlined, along with the elaboration of social structures and public works in ancient and medieval Europe. Gras then advanced the first coherent thesis about the emergence of metropolitan areas. By emphasizing the significance of "center" and "peripheral" relationships in economic systems, he illustrated (Gras 1926 ) how large centers manipulated trade flows to enforce dependency on hinterland regions and how this relationship was entrenched through the organization of markets via wholesaling, finance, and different modes of business administration.
A monograph about agriculture (Gras 1925 ) advanced a framework based on alternate types of crops and modes of cultivation. Industrial Evolution (Gras 1930a ) characterized economic growth as a transition from production for personal (Gras 1930b) or business administration (Gras 1931 (Gras , 1932 . Despite these efforts, by the middle of the 1920s, Gras viewed economic history as bland and indifferently studied, even though it was "a theme worthy of epic treatment." "There has been a woeful lack of controversy so that the whole story of economic progress seems to be cut and dried and entirely objective," he remarked. The subject showed "no intellectual resilience. There has never been published a single outstanding general treatise on American economic history. So far, for instance, no survey has been written, giving facts, showing lateral influences and displaying genetic connections" (Gras 1927, 29) .
THE FORMATION OF A FIELD
The dearth of archival collections of business records had been a major factor constraining scholarly investigations of the development of American business. Significant efforts to inventory and arrange the papers of large corporations were not undertaken until the interwar period. At Harvard, Edwin Gay facilitated a transfer of collections of trade periodicals to the business library, but his primary efforts were devoted to the construction of statistical databases. During 1924, George Woodbridge, a member of the administrative staff of the Harvard Business School, mobilized a group of faculty members and practitioners to support the formation of a national depository of business records, an "Institute of Business" that would aid research and stimulate respect for corporate enterprise. Dean Wallace Donham, who was in the midst of a massive expansion program, augmented the scheme by establishing the Business Historical Society and then enlisting Gay's help in persuading companies to affiliate with the association. Donham viewed the establishment of the depository at Harvard as a means of entrenching the school's preeminent status, and in 1927, the newly constructed Baker Library assumed possession of the collections accumulated by the Business Historical Society.
Wishing to maximize value from the project, Donham approved a proposal by marketing professor Melvin Copeland, one of the architects of the case method, that it could be exploited for the preparation of classroom materials. Funds for an endowed chair in business history were donated by three Straus brothers, the senior officers of R. H. Macy and Company, in memory of their father, Isidor Straus, who had died on the Titanic. But Gay (who had returned to the economics department) was not willing to undertake the applied work associated with the position, and none of the business faculty had the requisite skills for collating or appraising historical records. Gay, instead, persuaded Donham to appoint Gras at the munificent salary of $10,000 per annum, an arrangement that resolved the career problems of his former student.
Gras had garnered a significant reputation abroad and was awarded an LL.D. from the University of Western Ontario during 1925. Despite numerous publications and membership on the editorial board of the new Journal of Economic History, he still was not well known in the United States. Certain of the "futility" of traditional approaches, Gras redesigned the first-year course at Minnesota around business history. He later claimed that this initiative had received a positive student response, but the curriculum committee stripped the course from him. Privately, he rationalized away the situation:
I wanted to get rid of the course but did not want to be showed the door. . . . With great frankness I say that the fundamental force leading to the decision was the jealousy of my colleagues. A subordinate reason was my refusal to kneel to the president and the dean in the conduct of the course. (Gras 1962, 174) Temporarily teaching at Columbia, Gras readily accepted Donham's offer and noted, "What a chance, at 43 years of age to be at the top of one's profession. At least I shall be able to buy a cemetery plot!" But he realized that the business school, unlike the economics department, was a large enterprise where faculty performance was gauged by an aggressive development of new topics. "Harvard is a name that once meant attraction, magnetism, charm. Now it promises nerve-wracking work, petty jealousies, and disillusionment. Growing old is suffering disillusionment. In the face of knowledge, it is difficult to be enthusiastic" (Gras 1962, 178-79) . He asked to become the editor of a new Journal of Business and Economic History, which would be published under the auspices of the school and the Business Historical Society. However, Donham appointed him assistant editor and chose Edwin Gay as editor-in-chief. Gay had been "greatly interested but never enthusiastic" about Gras's efforts to teach business history but expressed a willingness to consider relevant articles-if they were scholarly and stimulating (Gras 1962, 16) .
Gras expected the construction of a coherent field would prove exacting. A scholar has great difficulty in putting off the old while he takes on the new. He tries to plough a single furrow, but finds it running into its neighbours' and perhaps not true to the compass. . . . There is no general treatise on business history, no encyclopaedic article dealing with it, and no journal devoted to its interests. The subject belongs so much to the future that it cannot now be satisfactorily formulated. This is all the more true in view of the fact that the science of business is still unformulated. (Gras 1934, 386) Not surprisingly, he delineated an approach that adhered to institutional catholicity and the pedagogy of the Harvard Business School. Broadly defined, business history represented "the collective biography of firms, large and small, past and present . . . a stream of living efforts held together by the quest for profits, distinction, and service." It might be interpreted as "a study of business units in conflict or in co-operation with other units" but should be distinguished from the broader domain of economic history that also encompassed commerce, finance, industrial organization, or agriculture (Gras 1934, 385-86) . "Business history is little concerned with these." It required explorations of modern events, whereas economic history focused on older phenomena. The latter had edged into social or general history by emphasizing the policy implications of economic issues and by dealing with subjects according to "old-time economic theory." In contrast, business history had "no more connection with economic theory than it has with psychology or politics" (Gras 1934, 385-86, 389) .
The subject "combines both constitutional history and administrative history in so far as it deals with the constitution and control of business. The control is partly a matter of policy and partly of management-the actualities of business" (Gras 1934, 389) . It was appropriate, given the needs of executives, to focus on the evolution of management and business policy. Much of this was "petty" and required researchers to understand specific functional activities. "Truly there is no prospect of a noble theme to be told in the grand manner." Research about administration was important but seemed "to lie quite outside the established disciplines in our liberal colleges" (Gras 1938a, 320) . There was, he suggested, an "honourable connection" between business and legal history in the "common methodology of the case. It has been found that the study and presentation of business history lend themselves to the case system. Whereas the legal case, however, has a verdict and a judgment, the business historical case has neither" (Gras 1934, 389) . By generating research that could be converted into classroom materials, the ability of students to solve business problems might also be enhanced. Gras became impatient with alternate approaches or subjective critiques of commercial affairs as he shaped the field to this conservative imprimatur. He characterized Miriam Beard's (1938) volume about the development of business as a frivolous "comic book to run around the tapestry of cultural history" since it classified executives with alternate types like "the priest, the warrior, the professional man, and the prostitute. But the business man has bells on his cap and dances with a cloven hoof" (Gras 1938a, 321) .
Integration of the subject into the curriculum proved difficult. Offered as "Policy Eight o'clock," the course started with cases about medieval England and initially was a debacle, forcing a return to lectures until new materials were prepared and Gras mastered the case technique. "Students told me that I gave them too much rope, paid too much attention to their point of view, argued with them too much. The army and navy men are great grade hunters, many are far from gentlemen, some are just commonplace" (Gras 1962, 181 ). An elective was introduced during 1928 and enjoyed high enrollments despite its supposed irrelevance to contemporary issues-"not the sort of study that a real business man would be interested in," Gras quipped (Cruikshank 1987, 161) . This took time, and his workload made research and writing increasingly unattractive. "It is a task, a chore, religiously done" (Gras 1962, 181) .
The Journal of Economic and Business History was an early casualty. An established doyen ensconced in the faculty of arts, Gay had numerous other projects. In 1929, he garnered a grant of $250,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation to establish a team of international scholars for the collection of data about commodity price movements. Gay had been instrumental in the formation of the Economic History Association and its Journal of Economic History during the 1920s. Not surprisingly, he wanted high-quality articles for his own journal. Gay also stressed macroeconomic issues rather than the study of firms and would not undertake the conceptual soul searching associated with the formation of a new field (Heaton 1952; Cole 1965) . The periodical, Gras later contended, had "a fatal duality. . . . There were two subjects represented, two horses to ride at the same time." Determined to build up the area of business history and to legitimate his role, Gras stressed the quantity versus the quality of manuscripts. In 1931, when the editor rejected an article based on a case study, Gras forced his resignation. Having carried out most of the day-to-day management, he was convinced Gay's function just lay "in lending his magnificent reputation to the venture," but the Business Historical Society immediately withdrew its funding. The eighteen months Gras served as editor before the journal folded proved a bitter experience. "I hate the task as one that has no intellectual continuity and that takes me from more important jobs. Editing is wiping the literary noses of other people" (Gras 1962, 183) .
Because the Harvard Business School operated as a quasi-autonomous unit garnering funds from its own operations, Gras's situation was complicated further when enrollment dropped by a third between 1929 and 1933, and budgets were slashed (Cruikshank 1987) . A research program had to be designed both to garner support from Dean Donham and to enlist corporate sponsors. In 1931, Donham approved his proposal for a monograph series, the Harvard Studies in Business History, which was modeled after analogous ventures in physics and biology between German businesses and universities. Gras had to plan the volumes, arrange financing, recruit researchers, and undertake the laborious job of editor. The sixteen books published by 1950 served as models for subsequent projects, and his guidelines became standard procedures. Research and publication were financed by corporate or family interests who ensured access to records. Gras saw this as "one of the promising coöperative efforts in our time." [That] business men seeking profits should be able to coöperate with an educational institution which was nonprofit-making and eleemosynary is something to be noted. . . . Business men are quite fair as quite generous and that they wish no favours, except . . . that the truth be told and always be told in the light of the circumstances of the time. (Gras 1962, 23-24) He demanded editorial freedom to ensure honest narratives. Sponsors could not delay publication or control content, and several initiatives were cancelled when restrictions were raised despite the financial gains that might have accrued to Harvard. The volumes were written by individuals trained at the business school, most of whom received doctorates of commercial studies. Excerpts were reworked into classroom cases, thus satisfying Donham's bent for practical materials.
The series represented one of the largest projects with financial support for doctoral candidates during the 1930s, and it attracted significant backing from the business community. The legitimacy of managerial enterprises came under attack from many social interests who held corporate leaders responsible for the Great Depression, and economic activities were increasingly subjected to regulatory restrictions by New Deal politicians. In counterpoise, various firms launched sustained efforts to validate their social roles by publicizing the contributions that had been made over time (Marchand 1998, 202-48) . Although Gras promised the series would provide objective analyses, a pro-business orientation often was advanced. "Scholars will have the greatest difficulty in learning business history," he declared, "because they have the most to eradicate before they begin to take in. They must learn that business is not predatory but social, that it is not the rival of culture but the all. . . . Many scholars think that all that is necessary is pass a few laws, regulate credit, raise or lower prices, and now, in our time, to get monetary stability." Rather, business required "a knowledge of human nature and operates successfully in the long run only in a spirit of fairness which itself defies complete analysis." Moreover, "the larger the business unit the strong the tendency toward a high ethical and social standard because such a standard is necessary in an atmosphere of publicity and criticism" (Gras 1944, 5-6) . If biographies of business leaders or companies had been available, "we might have had neither the New Era nor the New Deal. Clearly, if our thinking about business does not keep pace with our creative efforts in business, the whole business house may fall about our ear" (Gras 1944, 3) .
With access to source materials about business decision making, some researchers understandably sympathized with the problems faced by their subjects, and they drew attention to the importance of personality or the emergence of a "business mind." Because the monograph series was concerned with the rationales behind business policy, it stressed modern administration as the construction of order from chaotic conditions or parochial behavior. Several authors minimized the significance of corporate misconduct or dismissed criticisms raised by other interests. These tendencies, however, conflicted with the intellectual paradigm that dominated the historical profession during the interwar period. Based on the work of Charles Beard and other Progressive writers, large corporations usually had been portrayed in simplistic ways: economic anomalies constructed by ruthless "robber barons" and monopolies or oligopolies that routinely abused their market power and subverted traditional or democratic values. Progressive historians were concerned with the dynamic change of social organizations rather than their origins, with patterns of discontinuity rather than continuity. From their perspective, institutional scholarship belonged to an earlier era and dealt with less significant questions. Taking this logic further, some felt historians should construct relativist narratives that would document the need for political reforms or the reconfiguration of social values (Novick 1988, 86-108; Higham 1989, 183-97; Hofstadter 1968, 298-317) . The probusiness stance of the Harvard historians therefore was dismissed by many Progressives as arguable at best or sycophantic at worst.
Two volumes by Gras about moderate-sized enterprises set the tone of the monograph series. A history of the Massachusetts First National Bank of Boston (Gras 1937 ) charted its evolution from 1784. The rise of the firm to a dominant position in New England was linked to the region's separation from dependency on British financial institutions and emerging opportunities for local trade. The company then passed through a cycle of decline, which Gras tied to poor policies and administrative "moss." He mapped out a subsequent era of growth derived from a takeover by Boston investment bankers and the construction of new organizational practices. Gras pursued a similar orientation in a 1942 book about the Harvard Cooperative Society, a retail operation on the university campus. The evolution of leadership, financial arrangements, and organizational governance of the modest-sized enterprise were charted in meticulous detail.
The books written by his doctoral students, such as Henrietta Larson's (1936) biography of Jay Cooke, initially followed Gras's definition of the subject, but several presented distinctive interpretations. Ralph M. Hower (1939) was commissioned to prepare a memorial volume about an early advertising agency, N. W. Ayer and Son. His narrative considered how its operations had altered between the Gilded Age and the Great Depression, thereby providing insights about the implications for marketing associated with the rise of managerial capitalism. The narrative took a critical stance toward modern business, even though Hower's freedom of interpretation was not protected by a contract. Not only did he place the case history in an environmental context, but Hower also thoughtfully dissected the issues associated with mass advertising. He questioned, sometimes dismissed, claims advanced by advertisers about the social benefits of their activities, along with various allegations from critics of the industry. Hower (1943) also probed the development of Macy's, one of the first case histories about retailing. George Gibb (1943) retained the institutional notion of industrial evolution as a stagelike process in his study of a Massachusetts manufacturer, but he also appraised the social and economic environment of the firm and emphasized the significance of voluntaristic conduct or entrepreneurial personality as variables for organizational success. Like Hower, Gibb reviewed the emergence of the firm's competitive advantages in marketing, along with the bureaucratization of management.
One of the largest monographs, by Owen Stalson (1942) , chronicled the emergence of the marketing function among American life insurance companies and its relationship to the evolution of financial institutions. Still a standard reference, the study took a broad perspective toward marketing by examining the practices of alternate types of insurance companies during the preindustrial era, the adoption of mutualization as a competitive strategy, the tasks of agents and their segmentation into general (wholesale) and soliciting activities, and the introduction of "informed marketing" (characterized by sophisticated sales management) in response to competitive or regulatory pressures. Gras and Henrietta Larson (1939) assembled course materials for the first casebook about American business history, and he pulled the available research together for a 1939 survey. Although Business and Capitalism (Gras 1939 ) was portrayed as a synthesis predicated on the research at Harvard, its typology had been worked out in earlier papers (Gras 1930b (Gras , 1931 (Gras , 1932 (Gras , 1938a (Gras , 1938b . Common forms of business techniques or administration, he suggested, had typified different eras. Ancient and medieval history had been dominated by the petty capitalism of peddlers or traveling merchants. From the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, mercantile capitalism had unfolded with sedentary merchants in established offices who diversified their interests and created professional accounting techniques. That stage was supplanted by industrial capitalism, characterized by an internalization of business functions and the formation of oligopolistic producers. Between 1890 and 1930, the system metamorphosed into one dominated by finance capitalists who struggled over the control of firms and the enforcement of shareholder rights. Gras linked stock manipulations and other abuses after 1918 to a shift toward national capitalism in which the state coordinated key sectors and acted as an investment banker-a stage he portrayed as unfolding concurrently in New Deal America and National Socialist Germany. Posthumously (Gras 1967) , another phase was added: security capitalism that was characterized by a harmonization of private-and public-sector interests, along with the construction of the welfare state. While the framework paralleled his other typologies, the interpretation of twentieth-century developments rested on anecdotal evidence. The final chapters were quite subjective as Gras railed against abuses by business in the 1920s and politicians in the 1930s. Business and Capitalism certainly provided ideas for those interested in the evolution of administration, but the orientation was closer to economic than business history. The monograph was widely used at American universities owing to the absence of other surveys. Its narrative illustrated Gras's inability to advance beyond the institutional perspective, but until a large empirical literature was produced, it is dubious whether any scholar could have generated the synthesis to which he aspired.
Across the 1930s and 1940s, associates increasingly questioned his approach-especially the definition of business history as company biography and the focus on tracking the evolution of internal policies. Moreover, the importance the Business History Group at Harvard placed on personality or the role of ideas necessarily acknowledged the role of subjective and unpredictable elements. For some of their colleagues, this amounted to questionable revisionism because less importance was given to impersonal forces. It seemed to undercut efforts to develop history as a scientific discipline based on the documentation of deterministic explanations (Higham 1989, 202-6) . Arthur Cole (1965, 291) , head librarian at the Harvard Business School, noted that Gras reacted in a manner that seemed to derive from some inner compulsion; he needed to give the impression outside his circle that what he chose (or was forced to do) was in fact the right thing to do, and in itself very well worthwhile. Thus business history became temporarily enclosed in its initial narrow confines.
With students, Gras was cheerful and encouraging but privately, with colleagues, was perceived as abrasive because of his heavy workload. Despite pleasures derived from his family or forest walks, his journal entries often revealed a troubled and solitary man.
There can be no doubt that I should be ostracised, banished, even hanged. I do not send flowers on mother's day. I do not decorate graves on May 30th. I make no barks on July 4th. Church bells do not thrill me. . . . I find most stories stale, much news mere repetition, and most discoveries already discounted. My fellow man has but little interest, for his mind is atrophied. And yet I respect him as a feeble fellow-citizen. (Gras 1962, 182-83) With hindsight, much of the criticism aimed at the Grasian scholars appears unfair. The broader domain of economic history experienced serious problems defining a research framework during the interwar period, and the key advances tended to draw on European scholarship (see Cole 1942 Cole , 1944 Cole , 1945 . The approach of the Business History Group at Harvard mirrored disengagement within the historical profession from a concern with impersonal or external forces and a reconfiguration toward social and biographical analysis (Higham 1989, 204-5 Cole (1968, 578) legitimately observed, that period represented "the golden age of business histories."
DESTINY
Gras had oriented the monograph series toward individuals or moderate-sized firms as a means of ensuring the expeditious completion of projects, but by the late 1940s, members of Harvard's Business History Group began to emphasize research about large managerial corporations. There was "no business history of any great integrated concern," complained his protégée, Henrietta Larson (1948, 166) . A multivolume history of Standard Oil was proposed, but the dean of the business school initially opposed the potential drain on resources. After lengthy negotiations by Gras and several colleagues, the scheme was set up via an independent enterprise, the Business History Foundation. Although the tasks of research and writing the different volumes were assumed by younger colleagues such as Ralph Hidy and Henrietta Larson, Gras remained involved-using his contacts to facilitate access and helping with the complicated editorial activities. Concurrently, he helped Larson (1948) compile the first bibliographic reference for the field and undertook numerous trips across the United States to encourage the formation of business history societies and corporate archives-time-consuming obligations with few tangible rewards for his own career despite their subsequent value for researchers. He also took an interest in the public relations function but was disgusted by its use for self-congratulatory business "boosterism."
They want to convert the public to their way of thinking. . . . When the next crisis comes, public relations will be found wanting for it has not risen to the ideals and aspirations of the public. The public is disgusted with publicity, that is, staged shows which present only one-sided facts. Self-criticism, candid dealing are called for but are absent. (Gras 1962, 194) Long hours, self-doubt, and repeated disappointments took their toll. Gras "always appeared a man of restricted physical endowment and he seemed constantly to be fighting fatigue," Arthur Cole (1965, 292) commented. Despite an attack of angina pectoris prior to his retirement in 1950, he continued to lecture and arrange company histories. During October 1953, just before attending a banquet given by Alfred P. Sloan for a preview of a study of big business, Gras suffered a paralytic stroke. Several papers were drafted afterwards, but he usually remained too ill to read or write. "For one who had worked so hard and read so much this was almost unbearable," noted his wife (Gras 1962, 142) . He succumbed during October 1956, and his ashes were buried in the Grass family plot at Blenheim, Ontario.
Gras then suffered the most tragic fate that could befall a scholar. Within a decade, his presence was effaced from the field he had helped to found-wiped clean as if by the wrath of the gods. Contemporaries, such as M. M. Postan (1957, 485) , praised his "gift of comprehensive hypothesis and the same capacity for 'typographical classification' " and expected the medieval studies would stand as "his best known and most enduring contributions." But prior to his death, even these were challenged by researchers with access to enhanced statistical techniques (see Kneisel 1954) . Within a decade, citations of his publications nearly disappeared. His surveys were treated as curiosities, and references tended to be for specific facts presented in the empirical volumes. Only the metropolitan thesis was cited with any regularity. Ethel Gras arranged the reprinting of his books and compiled an anthology (Gras 1962 ) containing unpublished manuscripts. Notes for a three-volume, 2,000-page history of American business were edited down and released in 1967. For those who were still interested, this last work made manifest his inability to construct a synthesis. Rather than a product of empirical investigation, modified selections from Business and Capitalism were mixed with case materials published in Gras and Larson (1939) .
This problematic legacy can be linked to several issues. Although a gifted teacher and highly knowledgeable, Gras never constructed strong links with departments of history or economics, while the doctoral candidates in business history remained small in number. He was criticized by some colleagues for not generating a grand overview, by others for attempting to construct one before sufficient research was available. Because the Harvard historians necessarily stressed service for the business school, they seemed isolated from broader streams of academic discourse. No sooner had the field emerged, the University of Chicago's Richard Wohl (1954, 130-31) complained, then the focus, obliquely and passively, had narrowed and the consequence had been to divorce it explicitly from the main body of American economic history. . . . Once any specialty cuts itself off from the rest, does not supply the others new data and insights and refuses like nourishment in return, it suffers a fatal estrangement. The price for such aloofness is stagnation and gradual decline.
Case analysis, John Hutchins (1958, 461-62) of Cornell argued, neglected "theoretical formulation, rarely going beyond the deduction of currently useful generalizations. In some institutions where this method is extensively used the point of view becomes noticeably antitheoretical." Many business histories had not drawn on the social sciences and just recounted the sequences by which choices were made and implemented. "Business administration is much more than innovation and decision making; it also requires the government and motivation of men and the marshalling of resources" (Hutchins 1958, 461-62) . The field had been "too heavily influenced by the Germanic school of historiography," Columbia's Clarence Walton (1962, 33) grumbled. "Careful collection of data, sifting of sources, adequate documentation in the best von Ranke tradition are good things, but meticulous scholarship can result in overdetailed products" characterized by "horribly pedantic writing styles" and a failure to recognize "that brevity, too, has its place." By the late 1950s, as statistical analysis gained acceptance as a research tool, the value of company biographies was increasingly questioned unless they contributed to the validation of hypotheses about industries or economies.
A few colleagues such as Cole thought that these complaints were misplaced. "Since the withdrawal of Professor Gras from the scene, business historians seem much too modest and timid in viewing the potentials of their territory" (Cole 1962, 106) . His approach was "a tactically advantageous procedure for breaking the rather tough soil of its research area" (Cole 1965, 291) . Herman Krooss (1958) noted that it was easy to be patronizing toward interpretations that sketched stages of development, but without such generalizations, evolutionary patterns might not be recognized. Most historians based in business schools were "particularizers," specialists about individual firms-an outcome of the needs of management education for practical materials. Some had produced confused, vague volumes of encyclopedic observations, "large lumps of flesh with no skeleton to hang them on." Gras and a few others were 'generalizers," concerned with a "panoramic view" of business institutions and the construction of "provocative hypotheses." "They belong in liberal arts rather than in business schools. At Harvard they belong on the other side of the river." Krooss thought it ironic that Gras had emphasized the case approach and "dug much of the gap that now exists between Economic and Business History" since he was "a prolific and most provocative generalizer" (Krooss 1958, 471) .
After 1950, as American firms assumed dominant positions in the global economy, a wave of new historical scholarship examined the contributions of entrepreneurs and the durability of large corporations. Researchers such as Allan Nevins and Thomas Cochran sought to purify business history from the anti-business prejudices of Progressive writers and the perceived ills of institutional determinism. At Harvard in 1948, Arthur H. Cole tried to reenergize economic history by establishing a Center for Entrepreneurial History to coordinate research by academics from an array of subjects. Intellectual cross-fertilization brought young scholars such as Alfred D. Chandler and David S. Landes into contact with concepts elaborated by Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, the foundation stones of the synthesis that had eluded Gras (Galambos 1969) .
Norman Gras conducted much of the rarely acknowledged but essential spadework for business history in the United States. Despite many accomplishments, his ultimate tragedy was to be caught by the aphorism he most often used: "I suppose a man's reach should exceed his grasp." The entrenchment of the field took another generation and the acceptance of a paradigm that was elaborated by a subsequent occupant of the Isidor Straus chair. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. met Gras while a graduate student at Harvard during the late 1940s but found little merit in the older man's approach. Ironically, albeit quite appropriately, Chandler later characterized his seminal research about the emergence of the "visible hand" of professional management as "the New Institutionalism."
